The following is a short review of a book I recently finished. It is titled 'The GI Offensive in Europe: the Triumph of American Infantry Divisions, 1941-1945." The book was written by Peter R. Mansoor, who holds a doctorate in history and has taught at West Point, in addition to other Army assignments. The book was published by the University of Kansas Press in 1999.
The primary focus of the book is the establishment, training and subsequent combat maturation of the U.S. Army Infantry Divisions in the ETO. Mansoor's main idea is that the U.S. Infantry Division of the time was much more combat effective than a lot of historians
give them credit for. Mansoor states and provides evidence for his statements that the standard U.S. Infantry Division
was more than a match for its German opponents in Western Europe.
Now, before I lose any Wehrmacht fans, the author does give the German Army credit in recognizing that pre-1942, the Wehrmacht was the most
tactically proficient army in history. However, by the time of D-Day and beyond, Mansoor shows how the U.S. Army was
able to mature from its initial combat in North Africa to become a very effective combined-arms team by early 1945.
A number of reasons are explored as to why the U.S. Infantry Divisions became so effective. One of the
primary reasons for this is the U.S. Army's ability to sustain itself despite heavy combat. The much maligned
replacement system is looked at in depth, with the result being that while it was not perfect, the U.S. replacement system wore down the Wehrmacht by keeping
units on the front line for extended periods, something the Germans were not able to do.
Mansoor also talks about how the idea that the U.S. Army won by simple logistical superiority is not true. He describes
how logistics in and of itself does not win anything, but instead supplies a fighting force that must properly use that logistical support to accomplish
anything.
A few other ideas are the maturing of U.S. divisional leadership, creation of new tactics by field units, and integration of combined arms to a level unseen
before. Mansoor provides extensive references to support his statistics and other information he uses.
Overall, I would put this book in my top 5 of WW2 books. It is certainly one that U.S. devotees will like to
read. It also is a good companion to another book I reviewed, 'Closing with the Enemy' by Doubler. Taken together, these two books will demonstrate how the U.S. Army was so successful in the ETO.
Noah
